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1. Introduction
We investigate the varying relative importance of
commonly asserted motivations for earnings man-
agement, as revealed in the reporting behaviour of
Tooth & Co (a large Australian brewing company),
over the period 1910–1965.1 Using both quantita-
tive and qualitative archival sources, we explicate
the interdependent effects of motivations attributa-
ble to dividend policy and political costs. Our 
examination also highlights the effect of major
legislative changes, especially the Companies Act
(New South Wales) 1961, which restricted the
scope for opaque earnings management. Our paper
differs from the prior literature in the nature of the
evidence presented to support our explanation of
historical earnings management. We present pri-
mary source evidence of the motivations for, and
extent of earnings management in, the form of pri-
vate managerial memoranda and profit estimates. 
We identify and examine two forms of earnings
management that were persistently applied and as-
sumed significant magnitude at Tooth & Co:
• profit-smoothing behaviour – the manipulation
of accounting measures to reduce the variabili-
ty in reported profits.2
• profit-reducing behaviour – the manipulation of
accounting measures to understate reported
profit. 
Because of the reversing nature of accruals, un-
derstatements necessarily occur in some periods as
a consequence of true smoothing behaviour, but
neither understatement nor smoothing is a neces-
sary condition for the other. The relationship be-
tween the two phenomena is weaker in this study
because, while all accruals eventually reverse, re-
versals can be delayed for long periods (decades in
the case of Tooth & Co) and, under early disclo-
sure regimes, reversals were easily managed to
conceal their origins.
The next section provides a brief history of
Tooth & Co. In Section 3, we describe our evi-
dence sources and discuss methods and extent of
Tooth’s earnings manipulation. In Section 4 we
discuss the relevance of the motivations for earn-
ings management suggested by the early and re-
cent literature, and the extent to which these appear
relevant to the reporting behaviour of Tooth. In
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1 Tooth & Co Ltd brewing interests were sold in 1983 but
the corporation has continued as a listed investment company.
Any inferences a reader may draw regarding Tooth & Co Ltd
should not reflect on the post-1983 entity in any way.
2 This is distinguished from other smoothing devices, such
as adjusting the timing or magnitude of actual transactions.
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Section 5, we examine in detail periods of particu-
larly unusual reporting behaviour in the context of
the motivations identified in Section 4.
2. Tooth & Co – a brief history
The brewing firm that became Tooth & Co was
formed in Sydney in 1835, initially as a partner-
ship between John Tooth and Charles Newnham.
The company incorporated in 1859 and its shares
were offered for public subscription in 1888, by
which time it had secured approximately 31% of
the New South Wales (NSW) beer market.3 A se-
vere economic depression struck the Australian
colonies in the early 1890s, which Tooth survived
(unlike several competitors) and turned to their ad-
vantage by acquiring the freehold titles of many li-
censed establishments at bargain prices. While the
market was superficially competitive in the early
20th century, testimony to a 1901 parliamentary
inquiry into the ‘tied-house system’ asserted that
Tooth had sufficient market power to shut down
every competitor in Sydney if it so chose.4 Central
to this market power was the ‘tied-house system’,
whereby brewers secured the trade of licensed
pubs in a system where the number of licenses was
capped by regulation.5
Initially, ‘tying’ was effected predominantly by
means of loan covenants, and brewers used con-
tractual restrictions or other pressure to prevent
publicans from extinguishing the tie by clearing
the debt. Stubbs (1999: 94) estimates that, by
1901, 90% of the Sydney market was ‘tied’ by the
major brewers, with Tooth representing the major-
ity of these interests. Brewers spent considerable
resources trying to gain control of hotels tied to
competitors but the ‘loan-tie system’ was expen-
sive to administer and the ‘clogging’ of trade ties
was eventually struck down by the House of Lords
in 1902.6 Ultimately, the larger brewers secured re-
tail trade by acquiring the freehold titles and either
appointing a licensee-manager or sub-letting the
hotel under an exclusive supply agreement.
By 1911, when Tooth and a significant competi-
tor (Toohey’s) jointly purchased and liquidated the
large Marshall’s Brewery, the company’s market
share had reached 55%. In 1918, the five surviving
major brewers in NSW signed an agreement to fix
prices and refrain from interfering with each oth-
ers’ tied houses.7 By 1929, when Tooth took over
the large but financially crippled Resch’s Ltd,
Tooth had assumed control of all bar one of the
signatories to the 1918 agreement. Thus, in 1929,
Tooth controlled 80% of the NSW market and had
a single significant competitor, Toohey’s, with
whom Tooth dominated the United Licensed
Victuallers Association (ULVA), which dictated
minimum retail prices. 
Overlapping this period, the temperance move-
ment had some influence on political actions in
Australia, culminating in the Liquor Act 1905 that
introduced a ‘local option’ to prohibit alcohol sales
and increased the powers of the newly formed
License Reduction Board (LRB). The LRB had the
power to de-license premises for various reasons,
and the number of licensed premises in NSW
fell from 3,063 in 1905 to 2,059 in 1925, increas-
ing the value of surviving licensed premises.
Subsequently, the Great Depression temporarily
stunted Tooth’s growth but, after the initial de-
mand shock, Tooth embarked upon a massive ex-
pansion in their retail interests, increasing their
freehold titles from 420 to 553 between 1932 and
1936. The then NSW market was only 2,037 ho-
tels. Allowing for long-term leasehold properties
and tied houses, we estimate that Tooth directly
controlled approximately 50% of the hotels in the
state by the end of the decade. 
The Second World War (WWII) inhibited opera-
tions in traditional retail markets due to the ra-
tioning of beer, moratoria on capital works and
huge excise increases but, as will be shown later,
these effects were well cushioned by the extra de-
mand created by the allied armed services and in-
creased profitability of company-operated hotels.
The NSW Parliament passed the Monopolies Act
in 1941, prohibiting price-fixing and strengthening
provisions against anti-competitive behaviour.
Legal advice indicated that the price-fixing restric-
tion were of no direct consequence to Tooth be-
cause the ULVA, over which Tooth exerted
significant influence, officially determined mini-
mum prices.8 Government regulation of retail
prices, which began in 1942 and continued in
some form until 1955, was also of little conse-
quence to Tooth’s profits. Production costs, ex-
cluding excise, were falling during this period and
the combination of price controls and rationing en-
sured an active black market in bottled beer, the
profits from which trickled down into rents on
public houses. Rationing and capital works restric-
tions continued beyond WWII and the resulting
pent-up demand, once released, saw record levels
of inflation in the early 1950s. This reduced the
present value of long-term sub-leases on hotels. 
Two significant regulatory changes in the late
1940s and early 1950s were licensing changes that
allowed an explosion in the number of ‘clubs’ sell-
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3 Market share has been estimated by dividing Tooth’s gal-
lonage by Estimated NSW Consumption (Noel Butlin
Archives Centre, Australian National University (hereafter
NBAC). Tooth & Co Archive, Z223/86, Sales).
4 NSW, Select Committee on Tied Houses, ‘Report’ 1901.
5 See Knox (1958) for a discussion of this phenomenon in
the UK brewing industry.
6 Noakes & Co Limited vs Rice [1902] AC 24. 
7 NBAC. Tooth and Co Archive, N20/1279, Liquor Trades
Defence Union File.
8 NBAC. Tooth & Co Archive, N20/2875, Monopolies Act
File.
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ing alcohol and the end of compulsory 6 p.m. clos-
ing in 1955. The number of licensed clubs in NSW
increased from 87 in 1947 to almost 1,000 in 1960,
posing substantial competition to Tooth’s hotel
market.9 Although the major brewers secured the
trade of some clubs by installing beer drawing
equipment at discounted rates, in 1956 Tooth ex-
perienced their largest single-year fall in market
share. Coinciding with a major excise rise in the
same year, they reported a substantial drop in prof-
its. However, by the end of our sample period in
1965, the company’s performance had improved to
record levels in both real and nominal terms, al-
though Tooth’s market share remained below 72%.
Our study ends in 1965, after which Tooth expe-
rienced turbulent changes and eventual demise as
a brewer. In the years following 1965, Tooth faced
a substantial competitive disadvantage against
Toohey’s caused by the size of Tooth’s inner-city
brewery relative to its competitor’s much larger,
modern, suburban site.
During the 1970s, many freehold hotels were
sold in a market that Tooth had effectively flood-
ed. The Trade Practices Act 1974 outlawed the ex-
clusive trade deals, even for brewery-owned
premises. When the final appeal against this deci-
sion was lost in 1979, Tooth became the focus of
takeover speculation and, in 1983, were taken over
by Adsteam Ltd and their brewing assets sold to
Elders-IXL Ltd (now Fosters Brewing Group).
3. Tooth’s manipulations of reported profits
Throughout its existence as a listed brewing com-
pany (1888–1983), Tooth maintained internal
profit records for use by management. We compare
the internal profit measures derived from these
records to the reported profit measures contained
in the published annual reports.
The format of the internal records varied over
time, but the internal profit measures were consis-
tent across our sample period (1910–1965). We
omit the years prior to 1910 because of the un-
availability of tax return data,10 which we use to
estimate internal profit for the years 1910–1924
and to corroborate the measures of internal profit
for the years 1925–1965. The internal records do
not specify a unique profit for the years
1910–1924; therefore, we rely on taxable income,
as disclosed in the state tax returns, as the measure
for ‘internal’ income.11 Federal taxation law al-
lowed state taxation paid as a deduction and so
federally reported taxable income understates in-
ternal income. Dividends paid were an allowable
deduction under state law until 1920, and are
added back to determine internal income. Because
reported profit is net of tax, we adjust the pre-tax
internal profit by actual or estimated tax paid. For
the years 1925–1965, we take our measures of in-
ternal profit from detailed six-monthly income
statements that the company produced for internal
use.12 Internal data covering 18 months during
1955–1956 are unavailable, during which period
Tooth changed their financial year-end from
September to March. These years are excised from
our later time series analysis. The series of annual
published profits and internal profits are listed in
Table 1.
We begin our analysis by considering the meth-
ods used to manipulate earnings and extent of
earnings management across the sample period. In
Section 4 we conduct more detailed analysis of the
temporal variations in the level of earnings man-
agement.
Tooth’s reported profits were managed primarily
through the use of ‘secret reserves’. From its early
years as a public company, ‘provisions’ (contra-as-
sets) made against the value of fixed assets, re-
ceivables and inventory exceeded the amount
necessary to report those items in an unbiased
fashion. Prior to 1963, only the net carry values of
these items were disclosed in the published finan-
cial statements. From 1963, the new Companies
Act 1961 required the disclosure of the gross value
of the assets, their provisions and the balance of
the ‘provision for tax’ (tax payable).13 As sum-
marised in Table 2, in any given year for our study
period, increases in Tooth’s ‘secret reserves’ de-
creased reported profit.
Tooth had up to 25 separate ‘secret reserve’ ac-
counts recorded in its sundry creditors ledger.
Balance day entries to reduce reported profit de-
ployed the ‘secret reserves’ to reduce reported
fixed assets, receivables or inventory. To make the
balance-sheet composition appear reasonable, the
off-sets were made against different asset accounts
in different years, with no particular relationship
between the offset accounts; for example, in one
instance, a provision for depreciation account was
offset against reported net receivables. An excep-
tion to the practice of off-setting secret reserves
against assets was the treatment of the ‘provision
for taxation’. This balance was buried in, and rep-
resented at least 70% of, ‘sundry creditors’ until its
Vol. 37 No. 4. 2007 249
9 Off-license sales of alcohol were restricted to on-licensed
premises and a relatively small number of wine merchants.
10 NBAC. Tooth & Co Archive, Z352/37–42, Tax Returns.
11 A reconciliation of tax return data and individual line
items within Tooth’s internal profit and loss ledger across the
entire study period suggests that taxable income is a reason-
able proxy for internal income across these years.
12 NBAC. Tooth & Co Archive, N20/360–365, Departmental
& Combined Trading and P/L Accounts.
13 The use of ‘secret reserves’ is distinguished from the cur-
rent situation when an entity excessively depreciates fixed as-
sets because, in the contemporary environment, depreciation
expense, gross asset values and accumulated depreciation
must be disclosed. Similarly, contemporary manipulations of
bad debts expense is constrained by disclosure requirements
for the gross and net receivables, exposing the allowance for
doubtful debts to a credibility check.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 01
:09
 01
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
3 
legislated disclosure in 1963. The undisclosed
‘provision for taxation’ account approximated ac-
tual tax payable until 1934. Thereafter, tax expense
is significantly overstated until the early 1950s,
peaking at an overstatement of £472,000 (76%) in
1942. 
The extent to which understatements of reported
profits used the secret reserves is illustrated in
Table 2. Aggregate increases in secret reserves for
1910–1962 (£27.5m after adjusting for asset reval-
uations) account for 74% of the accumulated un-
derstatements in reported profits for the period.
The remaining understatements are attributed to
balance day adjustments made directly to asset
‘cost’ accounts. The secret reserves do not reflect
plausible provisions against assets values.14
Reported profits were always less than internal
profit but the extent to which the secret reserves
were defensible as smoothing provisions for future
losses, at the time they were created, remains
moot. This is portrayed graphically in Figure 1,
where the understated reported profit series also
appears much smoother than the internal profit se-
ries.15 A detailed analysis of the smoothing and un-
derstatements is presented in Sections 4 and 5. 
Although the understatement of reported profits
persisted throughout the study period, the balances
of the secret reserves did not grow unabated. This
is illustrated in Figure 2, which graphs the annual
balances of the secret reserves. This reveals sub-
stantial reductions in the secret reserves in 1927,
1948, 1954, 1958 and 1963. The reduction in the
secret reserves in 1927 was capitalised via a bonus
issue and a compensating write-up of asset values.
The 1948 reduction reflected a decision to disclose,
as an increase in accumulated surplus, almost £2m
250 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 1
Published and internal profit
Published Internal Published Internal
profit profit profit profit
Year £ £ Year £ £
1910 159,711 185,415 1938 841,839 1,876,379
1911 217,565 246,930 1939 855,709 1,848,770
1912 229,706 288,039 1940 870,299 1,872,290
1913 246,544 292,731 1941 809,036 1,959,608
1914 288,963 308,170 1942 763,439 2,055,822
1915 284,795 290,201 1943 789,041 2,160,348
1916 201,923 260,131 1944 839,623 2,232,758
1917 172,654 189,747 1945 858,022 2,338,101
1918 162,575 336,678 1946 862,956 2,392,114
1919 157,008 295,836 1947 884,516 2,530,343
1920 171,190 330,402 1948 916,292 2,108,289
1921 225,949 445,713 1949 943,159 2,143,611
1922 235,175 469,721 1950 958,808 2,406,949
1923 293,373 667,578 1951 949,246 2,149,276
1924 311,706 701,236 1952 952,776 2,024,133
1925 367,650 718,000 1953 1,013,740 2,364,005
1926 440,228 769,995 1954 1,075,075 2,599,483
1927 509,085 808,318 1955 1,180,909 N/A
1928 590,133 879,522 1956 619,361 N/A
1929 634,054 1,019,464 1957 1,238,963 2,312,274
1930 686,391 1,057,771 1958 1,278,412 2,652,770
1931 480,830 833,349 1959 1,322,170 2,455,374
1932 467,473 782,087 1960 1,368,171 2,828,139
1933 482,204 831,061 1961 1,470,422 2,807,779
1934 567,119 1,173,345 1962 1,504,830 2,571,429
1935 628,699 1,304,050 1963 1,911,231 2,831,660
1936 696,027 1,348,741 1964 2,189,437 2,890,702
1937 774,695 1,594,299 1965 2,252,895 2,907,695
14 Amounts provided against receivables, for example, fre-
quently exceeded 35% of the balance owing and in most years
were more than 10 times the bad debts actually written-off. 
15 The reduced measure and volatility of reported profits is
also evidenced by the first two moments of the distributions:
The standard deviation of reported profit is £494,733 against a
mean £753,639, while the standard deviation of internal prof-
it is £1,117,221 against a mean £1,471,066.
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Table 2
Changes in secret reserve and profit understatements
Change in Profit Changes in Profit
secret reserves understatement secret reserves understatement
Year £ £ Year £ £
1911 62,138 29,365 1938 1,006,382 1,034,540
1912 66,652 58,333 1939 930,162 993,061
1913 –209,695 46,187 1940 778,835 1,001,991
1914 89,728 19,207 1941 953,362 1,150,572
1915 37,773 5,406 1942 517,449 1,292,383
1916 21,583 58,208 1943 639,241 1,371,307
1917 37,574 17,093 1944 684,755 1,393,135
1918 168,009 174,103 1945 1,079,282 1,480,079
1919 103,574 138,828 1946 1,074,773 1,529,158
1920 169,973 159,212 1947 1,278,154 1,645,827
1921 491,183 219,765 1948* –2,300,492 1,191,997
1922 233,998 234,547 1949 720,487 1,200,452
1923 223,881 374,205 1950 948,680 1,448,141
1924 442,045 389,530 1951 697,277 1,200,030
1925 340,339 350,350 1952 262,736 1,071,357
1926 230,994 329,767 1953 985,950 1,350,265
1927* –532,619 299,233 1954* –2,602,173 1,524,408
1928 357,974 289,389 1955 1,248,504 N/A
1929 583,882 385,410 1956 471,971 N/A
1930 331,699 371,380 1957 1,447,117 1,073,311
1931 –9,031 352,519 1958* –3,452,102 1,374,358
1932 28,446 314,614 1959 1,607,292 1,133,204
1933 71,134 348,857 1960 1,347,291 1,459,968
1934 372,569 606,226 1961 1,718,038 1,337,357
1935 612,101 675,351 1962 908,526 1,066,599
1936 635,114 652,714 1963* –14,778,410 920,429
1937 701,177 819,604 1964 124,853 701,265
1965 –843,673 654,800
*Years in which reserves were closed to ‘companion’ accounts or disclosed as part of accumulated surplus
of ‘previously un-disclosed reserves no longer
deemed necessary’. Reductions in 1954 and 1958
were associated with reported asset revaluations, in
which provisions (contra-asset accounts) were
closed off to their companion accounts (fixed asset
and receivable accounts) prior to asset revaluations
through the reported asset revaluation reserve. The
largest adjustment occurred in 1963, when the
Companies Act 1961 required balance sheet disclo-
sure of all ‘provisions’ against the value of fixed as-
sets and receivables. The secret reserve accounts
and their ‘companion’ asset accounts were written
down by £13m, and the balance in the previously
secret reserves (approximately £4m) appeared on
the balance sheet as the required contra-asset ac-
counts, along with the provision for taxation. 
4. Motives for Tooth’s profit manipulations
The existence of persistent and significant under-
statements of reported profits may be explained by
both long-term and short-term motivations.16 The
study period commences several decades prior 
to the development of the accounting literature 
that addresses political costs and smoothing.
Therefore, to contextualise Tooth’s behaviour, we
consider both the relevant literature of the early
20th century and the main implications of the post-
1950 earnings management literature.17
The accounting literature of the early 20th cen-
tury discussed accounting manipulations for the
purpose of smoothing or reducing profit (e.g.
Dicksee, 1903; Littleton et al., 1929). Some ac-
countants actively championed the use of secret re-
serves for smoothing purposes; for example,
Walton (1909) as cited by Buckmaster (2001).
Smoothing was portrayed as a means of achieving
a lower cost of capital and to promote stable divi-
dend payments, implying a market aversion to
volatility in annual profits, irrespective of long-
16 We do not examine the considerable literature covering
incentives to overstate earnings, as this phenomenon was not
observed at Tooth & Co during our study period.
17 The invaluable review of the US smoothing literature in
Buckmaster (2001) directed our attention to many of these
early references.
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Figure 1
Internal profit v published profit 1910–1965
Figure 2
Total secret reserves and tax over-provisions
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term performance. The contemporaneous relation-
ship between reported annual profit and investors’
expectations of the dividend was a driving factor
behind the creation of ‘secret reserves’ and subse-
quent smoothing (Dicksee, 1903). Where a firm’s
underlying profit exceeded the ‘prudent’ level of
dividends, management were encouraged to un-
derstate reported earnings by creating undisclosed
reserves, which could be reversed subsequently
when the periodic profit was less than the desired
dividend payment. The rationale for such a close
relationship between current period earnings and
‘expected’ dividends was not legislative, given
that dividends could also be legally appropriated
from accumulated surplus, but may include the rel-
ative financial literacy of investors (Paton, 1932).
While early theorists accepted that secret re-
serves were often accumulated well in excess of
plausible smoothing requirements, they did not
identify reasons, additional to the dividend policy
motivation, for long-run profit understatement.
Dicksee’s essay is representative of those opposed
to the use of secret reserves:
‘Occasionally Reserves are provided far in ex-
cess of any loss that may be reasonably expected,
even by the most pessimistic. Such Reserves are,
of course, indefensible theoretically, for from this
point of view it is as improper to understate as it
is … to overstate.’ (Dicksee, 1903: 49) 
Criticism of smoothing is again reflected in
Paton (1932). Paton tackled issues such as the di-
rect crediting of gains to surplus (retained earn-
ings) and arbitrary depreciation adjustments in a
rejection of smoothing as sound business behav-
iour:
‘This whole proposition of developing stable
statistics for business enterprise characterised in
reality by marked instability is one of the most
unwholesome attitudes … After all is there any-
thing involved here but more or less sophisticat-
ed misrepresentation?’ (Paton, 1932: 262).
The consequences of using undisclosed re-
serves to enhance reported profits were high-
lighted in the spectacular collapse of the Royal
Mail Group in 1930–1931, which may represent
a turning point in popular perceptions of the ac-
ceptability of the use of secret reserves.18 In his
commentary on the Royal Mail case, Hastings
(1962) quotes evidence presented in the case that
the use of secret reserves was generally accept-
able through the 1920s. Davies and Bourne
(1972) attribute some degree of causation be-
tween the Royal Mail Group collapse and several
provisions of the UK Companies Act of 1948, in
particular the prohibition of the formation and
use of secret reserves.
Recent rationales of earnings management are
more circumspect. While stable dividends policies
may still be sought, the current nexus between dis-
closed annual profit and dividends is tenuous.
Following the focus on equity investor satisfac-
tion, which continued to emphasise earnings sta-
bility (e.g. Hepworth, 1953), and concurrent with
developments in finance theory, the literature ma-
tured to admit earnings management motivations
relating directly to other stakeholders in the firm.
The plausible motivations for earnings manage-
ment include: managerial self-interest; earnings
quality considerations; equity market preferences,
which include the earlier focus on dividend policy;
debt market preferences; and political cost consid-
erations. In the following sections, each of these
incentives to manage reported earnings is devel-
oped in relation to the Tooth & Co case.
4.1. Earnings manipulations and managerial 
self-interest
Theories of earnings management based on
managerial self-interest generally fall into one of
two categories: agency theory adaptations and
bonus plan incentives. An example of an agency
theory adaptation is the suggestion that secret 
reserves, rather than pertaining to the control of 
a firm’s dividend policy, provide opportunities 
to enhance the manager’s utility. The existence 
of managerial bonus plans affected by reported
earnings precipitate well-known incentives for
earnings management (see Healy, 1985). Relevant
to both categories, it has been argued that incom-
ing CEOs manage earnings downwards in the 
initial year of their incumbency and upwards in
subsequent years (see Wells, 2002; Godfrey 
et al., 2003). Neither category seems relevant to
Tooth. There were only two CEO changes during
1910–1965, each of which was planned and 
resulted in the deputy CEO assuming control, 
and Tooth’s management were not paid formal
bonuses.
It is also argued that a manager’s utility is en-
hanced by obtaining control over free cash flows
(Jensen, 1986). For this to be effective, the levels
of free cash flows should not be externally observ-
able. In the case of Tooth, the balance sheets clear-
ly reveal cash equivalents levels and changes.
From 1930 to 1955, Tooth’s cash equivalents bal-
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18 For more than a decade, the Royal Mail Group had been
trading at marginal profits or substantial losses, but reported
income was boosted via transfers from excessive provisions
for taxation held over from World War I. Lord Kylsant, the
company’s chairman was subsequently convicted of knowing-
ly issuing a false prospectus (for a debenture issue) that con-
tained representations in regard to annual profits. Kylsant was
acquitted of issuing misleading accounts because the phrase
‘Including adjustment of taxation reserves’ was disclosed in
relation to the calculation of profits, although there was no dis-
closure of the magnitude of such adjustments. 
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ances were substantially larger than reported prof-
its.19 This would indicate to investors that manage-
ment had control over large levels of discretionary
resources, suggesting that concealment of this was
not an objective in manipulating reported earnings.
4.2. Earnings management and the predictability
of future earnings
An alternative perspective on the motivation for
the smoothing of earnings is that the ‘smoothed’
published earnings figure better represents man-
agement’s perception of the long-run earning ca-
pacity of the firm, and thus the fair value of the
firm. This implies that a neutral application of ac-
counting standards results in an earnings level that
is an inferior predictor of future earnings than the
‘smoothed’ or otherwise managed earnings.
Recent evidence demonstrates that earnings that
have been adjusted to remove transient compo-
nents possess greater information content than
GAAP earnings (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002;
Burgstahler et al., 2002). However, the available
records of Tooth & Co do not provide any evi-
dence that Tooth’s earnings management was in-
tended to improve the reliability of reported
earnings as predictors of future earnings. 
4.3. Earnings management as a function of equity
market preference
A frequently cited motivation for earnings man-
agement is equity investor preferences for stable
earnings and dividends (e.g. Michelson et al.,
2000). While there is considerable variation in the
posited manifestation of such shareholder prefer-
ences, two central conjectures are common in the
literature: (1) risk-averse investors associate
greater volatility in reported earnings with greater
risk, which is reflected in an increased cost of cap-
ital;20 and (2) there are investors with preferences
for stable cash dividends. We consider the latter
with the emphasis in earlier literature on the con-
temporaneous relationship between annual profits
and dividends in our discussion of this dividend
focus.
Equity investor risk aversion
Investor disutility from perceived investment
risk is an accepted axiom of financial economics
that includes arguments that volatility in reported
earnings affects perceived investment risk.
Hepworth (1953) is typical of the early literature in
regard to earnings management, in that the rela-
tionship between earnings volatility and perceived
investment risk was implied rather than explicitly
stated: 
‘Certainly the owners and creditors of an enter-
prise will feel more confident toward a corporate
management which is able to report stable earn-
ings than if considerable fluctuation in earnings
exists.’ (Hepworth, 1953: 33)
Gordon (1964) develops an axiomatic theory of
income smoothing in which management rely on
continued shareholder satisfaction that, in turn, is a
function of ‘the stability of its income’ (1964:
262); but does not explicitly identify risk-aversion
as the motivation.21
The later literature emphasises a connection be-
tween profit smoothing and systematic risk, which
is priced by the market (Sharpe, 1964).22
Beidleman (1973) refines the earlier arguments,
positing that, by smoothing earnings, the per-
ceived systematic risk of the firm’s equity could be
reduced, thus reducing the cost of capital.23 The
conjectured association between smooth profit
streams and cost of capital does not require divi-
dends to be stabilised. Lev and Kunitzky (1974)
report a significant correlation between accounting
earnings volatility and systematic risk, and
Michelson et al. (2000) report that ‘smoothing
firms’ enjoy significantly greater stock returns
than others (for US S&P 500). The ‘perceived risk’
motivation is also supported by evidence regard-
ing the effects of earnings volatility on expected
non-diversifiable bankruptcy costs (e.g. Titman
and Trueman, 1986). Concern for the cost of capi-
tal will be greater when capital raising is planned.
Teoh et al. (1998) find evidence of upward earn-
ings management prior to seasoned public equity
offerings, consistent with a motivation to max-
imise the proceeds from issues. 
Tooth made seasoned equity issues in 1936 and
1962. However, both were rights issues priced at
less than 30% of the diluted minimum market
value of the shares in the five years prior to each
issue. It seems highly unlikely that Tooth per-
ceived any need to smooth reported profits to max-
imise the proceeds of these offers and we find no
direct evidence of such concerns in Board memo-
randa. Also, we know that Tooth persistently man-
aged reported profits downwards, which is
inconsistent with promoting the equity issues.
Managerial self-interest may provide an incentive
for this prior to a rights offering because Tooth’s
254 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
19 This assumes that cash equivalent balances and changes
are a reliable indicator of potential free cash flows.
20 A firm’s cost of equity capital is equivalent to investor’s
required return on equity, which in turn is a function of ex-
pected future dividends and capital growth. Changes in re-
quired return impact upon stock price. 
21 Gordon does explicitly identify the usefulness of current
reported earnings in predicting future earnings as being ad-
vantageous to shareholders. 
22 Systematic risk reflects the sensitivity of a firm’s stock re-
turn to market-wide returns, and as such cannot be costlessly
diversified away.
23 This presumes investors are systematically misled by the
smoothed reported income stream and that there exists a dif-
ferential level of smoothing across firms (Ronen and Sadan,
1981).
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rights offers allowed unsubscribed shares to be
taken up by other shareholders. The substantial
management shareholdings in the company pro-
vide an incentive to understate profits prior to the
offers, if they expect this to induce a lower share
price and a lower acceptance rate among external
shareholders. This may allow internal shareholders
to acquire a greater proportion of shares and at a
lower price than internal profits might suggest, ef-
fectively transferring wealth from the external
shareholders to management. Such a wealth effect
would, of course, only be realised if subsequent in-
formation was released informing the market of
the ‘true’ profitability of the entity. However,
Tooth’s issues were offered at a massive discount
on the diluted market value; this would have en-
couraged external shareholders taking up their
rights and so it seems unlikely that such wealth
transfers were a motive. 
Dividend focus
We previously noted two dividend policy moti-
vations for earnings management. These concern
the relationship between investor’s expectations
regarding reported profit and the magnitude of
cash dividends: (1) management reduce reported
profits to ameliorate pressure to pay high divi-
dends, because higher distributions may be con-
trary to either the firm’s or managers’ long-term
interests; and (2) earnings management to smooth
earnings may facilitate a stable dividend payout
policy, which investors may prefer.
Gibson (1971), describing early Australian
practice, argues that the income statement was re-
garded as little more than a justification for the
current dividend.24 Similarly, Buckmaster (2001),
citing a series of early articles from the profes-
sional literature, identifies a widespread attitude
among UK and US investors that ‘accounting in-
come measures the proper amount of resources to
be distributed as dividends for that period and cor-
porate directors apparently felt pressure to make
such distributions’ (p.25). Dicksee (1903, p.49)
attributes both smoothing and long-term profit un-
derstatements to the ‘notorious weakness of
shareholders’ in regard to their dividend demands
and their adverse reaction to firms maintaining
large reported reserves. Such attitudes persisted
into the 1940s, when US accounting regulators
explicitly warned companies that reserves for war
contingencies were not to be used to smooth in-
come or dividends (Buckmaster, 2001: 25).
Investors’ expectations have matured since the
first half of the 20th century, and the more recent
literature that focuses on earnings smoothing
identifies the dividend-related objective as facili-
tating a stable dividend policy, rather than the
level of distributed dividends relative to reported
profits (e.g. Hepworth, 1953; Ely and Mande,
1996; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995).
Tooth’s ‘dividend focus’ is revealed in two ways:
via the contents of internal company communica-
tion, and through the observed relationship be-
tween current reported profit and dividends. 
A 1931 Board Memorandum argues for the
maintenance of secret reserves: ‘to enable a divi-
dend to be paid in bad times’.25 A 1933 Board
Memorandum asserts the following in regard to
the effect of increasing dividends:26
‘This will satisfy the shareholders for the time
being, but they will probably look for a similar
dividend next year and will be disappointed if
they don’t get it …’
‘… The shareholders are … already well satis-
fied with their return from the Company’s
shares, which has been more stable than proba-
bly that of any other organisation throughout the
depression.’
The relationship between Tooth’s reported profit
and internal profit, dividends and disclosed cash
equivalents (cash and government bonds) are illus-
trated in Figure 3. The graphs indicate a close con-
nection between periodic reported profits and
dividends, with some divergence becoming more
apparent in 1963. A dividend policy based on in-
ternal profit would have produced a more erratic
stream and, potentially, a greater drain on cash.
4.4. Debt market preferences
The earnings management literature identifies
two aspects of motivations for profit smoothing (or
short-run profit-increasing manipulations) arising
from a debt market preference for borrowers with
stable earnings. First, it is argued that a stable pat-
tern of historical earnings will reduce a lender’s
perception of the risk of the potential debtor and
thus reduce the cost of debt (Hepworth, 1953).
Second, where restrictive loan covenants attach to
existing loans or debenture issues are written in
terms of accounting earnings or ratios, manipula-
tion of reported profit may sometimes allow a bor-
rower to avoid breaching such covenants. Defond
and Jiambalvo (1994) report a higher likelihood of
profit-increasing manipulations in years prior to the
breach of debt covenants. However, neither the cost
of debt capital nor the avoidance of debt covenant
breaches are relevant, as Tooth had no debt other
than low levels of short-term trade credit.
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24 Publication of a profit and loss (income) statement was
not compulsory for NSW listed companies until 1925, when
the Sydney Stock Exchange requirements were strengthened.
The NSW companies legislation did not require publication of
an income statement until 1936. 
25 NBAC. Tooth & Co Archives, N60/287, Tooth’s &
Toohey’s Financial Figures.
26 NBAC. Tooth & Co Archives, N60/286, Tooth’s &
Toohey’s Financial Figures.
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4.5. Earnings management and political costs
Firms with highly visible earnings may have in-
centives to understate profits or smooth earnings
growth to avoid adverse political attention (Watts
and Zimmerman, 1978). Political costs can arise
from adverse reactions to reported profits or mar-
ket power. Costly adverse reactions include labour
disputes and demands for higher wages, increases
in taxation and excise duties, and industry regula-
tory responses (such as prohibition, licensing con-
ditions and quotas, controls over trading hours,
price controls and actions against anti-competitive
behaviour). 
Wage pressure
If negotiated wage levels are affected by the em-
ployer’s capacity to pay wages, as proxied by re-
ported profits, an employer may perceive an
advantage in avoiding significant increases in re-
ported profits, particularly in periods of major
wage negotiations. Godfrey and Jones (1999) re-
port a recent positive relationship between the
level of unionisation in a firm’s workforce and in-
come smoothing in modern Australian firms.
Earlier, Hepworth (1953) explicitly observes the
potential dangers of perceived excessive profits in
regard to industrial relations:
‘A sharp increase in reported profits is very like-
ly to produce in the minds of the members of the
working force that they should participate to a
greater extent in such profits, with resulting de-
mands for wage increases, strikes and general in-
dustrial unrest.’ (Hepworth, 1953: 33)
There is direct evidence that pressure for ‘profit
sharing’ from wage earners due to increases in 
reported profits concerned Tooth’s board, as 
observed in board correspondence of 1931 regard-
ing the effect of high dividend payments on the
256 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Figure 3
Dividend policy, profits and cash equivalents
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 01
:09
 01
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
3 
labour market:
‘The company has already taken advantage of
the 10% cut in wages, recently allowed by the
Federal Arbitration Court in certain trades, and
is now negotiating with the Brewery Employees
Union for a similar reduction … even continu-
ance [of dividends] at the existing rate may give
employees an opportunity to criticise the policy
of the company.’27
Tooth’s recognition of a need to limit or reduce
dividends to assuage potential negative labour sen-
timent is juxtaposed with perceived shareholders’
expectations that dividends will appropriate most
of the reported earnings. Consequently, understat-
ing profits facilitates both lower dividends and less
wage pressure. 
Taxation and excise
In regimes where the measurement of taxable in-
come is based heavily on accounting income, the
manipulation of reported earnings can directly af-
fect taxation cash flows (Hepworth, 1953: 34).
This is unlikely to have played a prominent role in
Tooth’s reporting decisions because, except for the
very early years of federal taxation, the taxation
rules were not closely aligned with accounting
practices and so the calculation of taxable income
was largely independent of accounting income.
Manipulations of depreciation, allowances against
bad debts and the tax provision itself were Tooth’s
main methods of understating reported profits, but
the maximum allowable depreciation rates for tax
purposes were stipulated by law and bad debts
were deductible only when actually written-off. As
reported earlier, Tooth’s taxable income (as dis-
closed in their tax returns) is closely aligned with
our measures of their internal profit.28
While we thus discount income taxes as a mo-
tive for Tooth’s profit manipulations, excise duty
offered greater motivation. Excise duty, a Federal
tax on alcohol produced, was the largest single
component of Tooth’s cost of goods sold, ranging
from 40% in 1925 to 73% in 1943. For the years
where sufficient information is available to calcu-
late effective excise rates based on Tooth’s total
gallonage, the relationship between excise and gal-
lonage (in decimalised £s) is shown in Figure 4.29
Excise increases caused two undesirable out-
comes for Tooth. First, consumer price sensitivity
meant passing on excise increases to customers
was likely to reduce total alcohol consumption. In
February 1939, Tooth’s wrote to the Federal
Treasurer to unsuccessfully lobby against a pro-
posed excise rate increase, citing an expected fall
in demand of 12.5% should the proposed excise
increase proceed.30 Second, passing on increases
to consumers induced substitution effects that
could have reduced Tooth’s profits. For example,
wine and spirits became more competitive because
excise increases induced smaller percentage in-
creases in their prices, and Tooth’s profit margin
for their beer was much higher than their margin
on wine and spirits for which they were merely re-
sellers. Conversely, excise reductions offered po-
tential gains to the extent that they were not passed
on to consumers or through increased consump-
Vol. 37 No. 4. 2007 257
Figure 4
Excise payable as a proportion of Tooth’s production gallonage
27 NBAC. Tooth & Co Archives, N60/287, Tooth’s and
Toohey’s Financial Figures.
28 The reported profitability of large businesses may affect
the likelihood and direction of future changes in company tax
rates (Adhikari et al., 2005) although it is unlikely that these
effects result in periodic changes in behaviour in stable taxa-
tion systems.
29 Explicit amounts for COGS and Excise paid are only
available for the period 1925–1965. Prior to 1925 the amount
included in internal accounts as Excise expense does not in-
clude that amount already embedded in gross profit.
30 NBAC. Tooth & Co Archives, N60/211, Excise.
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tion, and to the extent of any substitution from
wine and spirits to the higher yielding beer. 
A greater concern may have been the extent of
substitution between vending units for draught
beer sales. Beer was sold in at least three different
sized glasses, and the retail price per fluid ounce
varied across these glass sizes. Due to the limited
divisibility of currency, it was not possible to pre-
cisely adjust retail prices per glass to reflect excise
increases. A change in the relative prices of the
beer sold in ‘middies’ and ‘schooners’ resulted in
non-uniform price changes which could shift de-
mand towards the lower yielding glass size.
Tooth’s concern with this substitution effect is ev-
idenced by the extensive research files maintained
on the relationship between excise rates and sales
mix.31
For excise changes to provide an incentive for
earnings management, it is assumed that either: re-
ported profits influence the government’s percep-
tion of brewers’ capacity to pay excise; or that
reported profits were believed to influence the
public’s attitudes. Expected influences on the gov-
ernment’s perceptions may induce profit manipu-
lations in advance of prospective excise changes.
Both expected government and public responses
may induce manipulations subsequent to excise
changes. It is, of course, arguable that knowledge-
able employees of the Federal Treasury (responsi-
ble for providing policy advice to the
government), did not regard published earnings as
a reliable measure of a firm’s capacity to pay.
However, the likelihood of further government in-
tervention increases with public pressure for ac-
tion (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Increases in
reported profit following a change in excise rates
may induce public resentment that, in turn, may af-
fect regulatory behaviour and consumer demand.
The NSW Labor Council, for example, had a
standing Liquor Investigations Committee, which
was vocally opposed to the ‘enormous accrued
profits of the breweries’.32 Figure 4 graphs excise
rate increases in 1930, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943,
1952 and 1956. Assuming no other influences, the
years subsequent to these should exhibit higher
than average income-reducing behaviour, and
lower than average growth in reported income.
Regulatory threats
Because brewing is a highly regulated industry,
Tooth may have reduced or smoothed profits to in-
fluence potential non-tax regulatory responses, in-
cluding price controls, and market or licensing
quotas, if they believed that reported profits influ-
ence regulatory decisions. This would be consis-
tent with behaviour observed elsewhere. For
example, Jones (1991) reports evidence of in-
come-reducing earnings management by firms
subject to import relief investigations and
Sivakumar and Waymire (2003) report that in-
creased conservatism in income measurement was
significantly associated with regulation of the US
Railroad industry in the early 20th century. 
Consistent with Watts and Zimmerman (1986;
222–235) regulatory responses are more likely
where some degree of monopoly power is evident
or competition is weak. Sustaining abnormally
high profits is a readily observable signal, to both
government and the public, of a non-competitive
market. High profits may also attract competition.
The economics literature had previously addressed
such concerns. For example, Alchian and Kessel
(1962) identify potential regulatory responses to
excess profitability as incentives to reduce report-
ed profits, Williamson (1963) develops a behav-
ioural model in which reported profits are
constrained by the political costs of threatened reg-
ulatory changes, and Hall and Weiss (1967) argue
that large firms use accounting manipulations to
understate reported earnings and so understate the
difference in profitability between large and small
firms. 
Tooth’s market power throughout the sample pe-
riod suggests the threat of regulatory interference
was persistent but not of a constant magnitude. It
may have been variously affected by Tooth’s rela-
tive performance, the rate of growth in Tooth’s
market share, and changes in political and regula-
tory attitudes. Growth in market share peaked be-
tween 1934 and 1940, when Tooth’s freeholdings
increased from 432 to 605 hotels and market share
increased from 80% to 90% of NSW beer con-
sumption and most growth in Tooth’s market share
occurred near the end of this period. Tooth exhib-
ited the greatest proportionate growth in internal
profit in the years 1934–1938, which also included
the majority (128) of the hotel acquisitions. Had
the cost (or fair value) of the newly acquired hotels
appeared on the balance sheet without adjustment,
Tooth’s increasing domination of the retail market
would have been easily discerned by government
and by interested sectors of the community (par-
ticularly those favouring nationalisation of indus-
try). By understating profit and offsetting the value
of fixed assets, the extent of Tooth’s increasing
market dominance was concealed. The disclosed
increase in the net value of property, plant and
equipment was only £1.3m compared to the gross
increase of £3.8m.
Regulatory concerns in anti-competitive markets
often focus on price. In Tooth’s case, the only
changes in the wholesale price of beer during the
entire sample period were those accompanying ex-
cise rate changes. While retail prices were official-
258 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
31 NBAC. Tooth & Co Archives, N60/211 and N20/2664,
Excise.
32 Sydney Morning Herald, ‘Probe into New Beer Price’,
1/12/1951.
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ly set by the ULVA, and such changes flowed
through to Tooth’s via rents on public houses and
returns on company-operated hotels, we have not
found any evidence that Tooth identified a direct
link between reported profitability and prices
charged other than in regard to excise changes.
During the period 1942–1955, when price increas-
es required government ratification, regulatory au-
thorities had the power to inspect a company’s
books of account. The information provided by
Tooth when seeking wholesale price increases fol-
lowing excise rate changes in the 1950s included
disaggregated information based on their internal
profit figures in support of such applications.33
While the regulator was well-informed, the public
were not. We contend that the main political con-
sequences for Tooth derive from public percep-
tions of profitability.
Substantial civil and economic disruption also
raise political costs and adverse public responses
as perceived risks. The study period includes the
two world wars and the great depression. These
and the other events identified as potentially im-
pacting on Tooth’s profit manipulations are sum-
marised in Table 3. We use this data in the next
section where we examine Tooth’s profit manipu-
lations over time.
5. Tooth’s profit smoothing and under-
statements over time
The anecdotal internal evidence indicates that
Tooth’s partial smoothing and persistent under-
statement of reported profits apparent in Figure 1
are consistent with the avoidance of dividend de-
mands and some profit-based political costs. Less
obvious are the reasons behind the varying degrees
of earnings management in different years. We
first examine the circumstances of particular peri-
ods of seemingly aberrant reporting behaviour, in-
corporating the relevant arguments raised in
Section 4. We then use regression analysis to sta-
tistically test the relative importance of the various
events and circumstances identified in the discus-
sion.
5.1. Periods of seemingly aberrant reporting
Obvious exceptions to the general trend of
steady growth in reported profits apparent in
Figure 1 are the periods 1916–17, 1930–34,
1940–43, 1951–52, 1956–58 and 1962–1965. These
periods also contain most instances of the factors
potentially affecting earnings management prac-
tice discussed in Section 4 and listed in Table 3,
summarised thus:
1916–1917 Genuine deterioration of perform-
ance and lower reserves with which
to smooth income, 6 p.m. closing
1917.
1930–1934 Excise increase 1930, excise de-
crease 1932, wage cuts in 1931, re-
tention of cash to finance acquisition
of hotels from 1934–1937, anti-trust
concerns following acquisition of
Resch Ltd.
1941–1943 Excise increases in 1940, 1941,
1942, introduction of rationing, high-
er dividend pressure due to high cash
balance, Monopolies Act 1941.
1951–1952 Royal Commission into liquor trade,
relaxation of restrictions on clubs,
excise rise 1952.
1956–1958 Excise rise 1957.
1961–1965 Introduction of Companies Act 1961,
Rights issue in 1962.
Period 1: 1916–1917 
The financial years ending in 1916 and 1917 ex-
hibited serious declines in profits. Internal profits
declined by 34% over the two years (from
£290,201 in 1915 to £260,131 in 1916 and
£189,747 in 1917). Instead of using the secret re-
serves to moderate this decline, the reserves were
increased and reported profits exaggerated the de-
cline to 39% (from £284,795 in 1915 to £201,923,
in 1916 and £172,654 in 1917). Possible reasons
for Tooth’s failure to use the secret reserves to
maintain smooth profits include:
1. The absence of smoothing incentives – howev-
er there is no evidence to suggest that smooth-
ing incentives should be lower during this
period and merely reporting the internal profits
would have lessened the reported declines; 
2. Auditor resistance to overstatements – however
there is no documentary evidence of auditor re-
sistance to attempted overstatements of current
profit and this would not have encouraged un-
derstatements; 
3. Management belief that the decline was ‘per-
manent’ and should be reflected in reported
profits in order to enhance the usefulness of cur-
rent earnings as a predictor of future earnings; 
4. Management perceived advantages in reporting
the decline. 
While 3 above remains a plausible explanation
for Tooth’s reporting behaviour in this period but
does not explain the increased understatements,
we argue that the combination of factors detailed
below indicate that perceived advantages to Tooth
is the more likely explanation. The previously
cited internal evidence indicates that dividend re-
ductions were a driving factor and the dividend
Vol. 37 No. 4. 2007 259
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260 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 3
Historical events potentially impacting on earnings management
Financial
year Event Potential effect on earnings management
1912 Takeover and closure of Marshall’s Brewery. Nil. Tooth’s interest in the takeover was 
Tooth advanced funds to a 3rd brewery for not publicly known at the time.
the purpose of taking over Marshalls
1916 6 p.m. closing introduced, Also Incentive to depress reported earnings 
compulsory rent reductions under Liquor Act following introduction of these measures.
1919 Introduction of Liquor (Ammendment) Act 1919, Incentive to depress earnings in period prior 
which extended 6 p.m. closing and introduced to finalisation of Act in effort to secure 
compensation for de-licensed premises most favourable compensation terms.
1919 Anti-competitive agreement signed with other Nil. Existence of the agreement not publicly 
Brewers known.
1920 Rights issue of equity Ambiguous (see discussion)
1921 Issue of equity to acquire business of Incentive to depress reported profit in 
Castlemaine Brewery regard to anti-competitive behaviour.
1924 Acquisition and closure of regional breweries As above
in the Riverina district
Rights issue of equity
1928 Referendum considering Prohibition is held Long-term incentive to depress earnings 
and soundly defeated prior to referendum (the referendum had
been planned since 1919).
1930 Acquisition of Reschs Brewery Strong incentive to report reduced income.
Excise increase
Beginning of Great Depression
1931 Government sanctioned wage cuts As above
Reduction in dividends
1932 Excise Reduction As above
1934 Mass acquisition of freehold hotel properties Strong incentive to ‘smooth the balance 
begins (continues to 1939) sheet’ (to obscure evidence of expansion in
retail premises).
1936 Rights issue of equity Ambiguous (see discussion)
1939 Small excise rise Incentive to reduce reported income.
1940 Large excise rise As above
1941 Monopolies Act introduced As above
Large excise rise, rationing of beer and capital 
works
1942 Large excise rise As above
1951 Relaxation of legislation allowing explosion As above
in number of licensed clubs
Maxwell Royal Commission into the Liquor
Industry
1952 Large excise rise
1955 End of 6 p.m. closing Ambiguous
1957 Large excise rise Incentive to reduce reported income.
1961 Companies Act 1961 introduced requiring Reduced ability (in future years) to reduce 
disclosure of all amounts provided against reported income.
assets and provision for taxation
1962 Rights issue of equity Ambiguous
1963 First published statement affected by 
Companies Act 1961 requirements
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rate was reduced in 1916, owing to ‘increased
costs of production’ and ‘additional taxation’.34
The increased taxation resulted from the introduc-
tion of federal income tax, though the effect on
total tax payable was only of the order of £10,000.
Hotel trading hours were reduced in the 1917 fi-
nancial year, during which time a mandated reduc-
tion in rents also decreased both reported and
internal profit. The sustained decrease in reported
profit also coincides with the imposition of new
taxes and the Liquor (Amendment) Act 1916 that
instituted 6 p.m. closing of public houses. The reg-
ulatory changes may have provided sufficient jus-
tification for reduced reported profits to avoid the
shareholder-related costs associated with a reduc-
tion in the dividend rate.
Period 2: 1930–1934 
The substantial decrease in reported profit for
1931 and lack of recovery until 1934 largely fol-
lows internal profits. However, Tooth had more
than sufficient secret reserves to report smooth
modest growth in reported profit; indeed, reporting
unadjusted internal profits would have accom-
plished this (see Figure 1). Possible reasons for re-
porting the decline include political costs of
anti-competitive behaviour that may have been
higher during this period for several reasons, and
opportunities for further expansion:
1. The extent of the depression may have indicat-
ed some level of reported profit reduction to be
prudent because of a possible public or con-
sumer backlash. 
2. Tooth’s acquisition of Resch Ltd in 1929 in-
creased their market share from 68% to 80%.
Most of the remaining market share belonged to
Toohey’s Ltd, with whom Tooth fixed minimum
retail prices via their domination of the ULVA.
Reporting performance superior to that of com-
petitors and other consumer product markets
may have risked a greater likelihood of increased
regulatory action in the brewing industry.
3. Tooth was vocal in its objection to the 1930 ex-
cise increase, and reporting a strong fall in profits
immediately thereafter would have strengthened
their case for repeal. Despite a slight recovery in
internal profits, reported profits were kept rela-
tively flat.35 Subsequently, a 1933 Board memo-
randum discussing possible uses of undisclosed
reserves made the following comment: 
‘A substantial increase in dividend at this stage
might easily lead to a certain amount of public
resentment. During the debate in the Federal
House on the excise reduction, suggestions
were made that the trade had been treated too
liberally … a substantial increase of dividend
now would tend to revive a feeling of public re-
sentment and might easily lead to the excise
being increased … In the meantime we are actu-
ally aiming for a further reduction in excise.’36
4. The above memorandum also reflects the per-
ceived connection between dividend policy and
political costs. Given that dividend policy was
linked to reported income, this juxtaposition in-
dicates a further incentive to depress reported
earnings. Dividends were reduced in the 1931
financial year and did not return to their 1930
level until 1936.
5. Although the depression was harmful to the
trading performance of Tooth, discounted asset
prices also provided an opportunity for a signif-
icant expansion of freehold properties. Tooth’s
expectations in this regard is evident in the fol-
lowing extract from a 1931 Board memoran-
dum considering dividend policy:
‘With the general decline in market value of prop-
erties the Company should have opportunities of
acquiring valuable freehold hotel properties at
prices which would not have been credited say
twelve or eighteen months ago … provided the
Company has sufficient ready money available,
it will be able to secure valuable trade outlets in
solid districts at very low cost.’37
During this period Tooth increased its freehold
hotels from 400 to 553. The related need for cash
resources and the possible political costs associat-
ed with the depression, growth in market share,
and lobbying in relation to excise, meant that
lower dividends and lower reported profits were
desirable. The need for cash is evidenced by a
rights issue of equity in 1935. 
Avoiding the possible political costs associated
with the public recognition of the extent of the
company’s grip on the retail market, which would
be facilitated by disclosing these acquisitions,
meant that the extent of the increase in fixed assets
had to be kept off the balance sheet, further requir-
ing the concealment of profits. Despite an increase
in gross fixed assets of £3.6m (based on internal
records), net fixed assets increased by just £1.3m
on the published balance sheet.
Period 3: 1941–1943 
Despite the pressures of wartime restrictions 
on domestic demand, Tooth’s internally reported
profits grew steadily during WWII. Published
profits, however, show a decline in both 1941 and
1942. Public and political concerns regarding war-
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34 NBAC. Tooth & Co Archive, N20/4000, Tooth’s Annual
Reports and Balance Sheets.
35 From 1932 to 1933, internal profit grew 6.26% but re-
ported profits were increased by only 3.15%.
36 NBAC. Tooth & Co Archives, N60/286, Tooth and
Tooheys Financial Figures.
37 NBAC. Tooth & Co Archives, N60/287, Tooth and
Tooheys Financial Figures.
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time sacrifices and profiteering may have indicat-
ed some level of reported profit reduction to be
prudent. Government restrictions on repairs and
maintenance expenditure also caused the balance
of cash equivalents to rise significantly, potential-
ly adding to pressure for dividends if higher prof-
its were disclosed. Superficially, the introduction
of the 1941 Monopolies Act may appear to have
encouraged profit understatements but, as noted
earlier, Tooth’s legal advice indicated that this leg-
islation was not a cause of great concern and was
thus unlikely to have motivated reporting behav-
iour. However, excise duties again appear to have
been a concern. After a very small rise in excise in
the 1939 financial year, the excise rates rose three
times from late 1940 to late 1942. The aggregate
increase in the excise rate during this period was
123% of the 1939 excise rate. 
Period 4: 1951–1952 
The 1951 Maxwell Royal Commission into the
Liquor Industry posed a substantial political threat.
Its terms of reference covered most aspects of the
liquor industry, including the tied-house system,
concerns over the monopolistic behaviour in the
industry, and the issue of 6 p.m. closing. The
Commission sat through 1951–1952 and its find-
ings were generally known in 1953 and formally
published in 1954. From Tooth’s archives it is
clear that very substantial time and resources were
devoted to submissions to this inquiry. Over such
a period Tooth’s earnings must have been highly
visible and sensitive.
Most of Tooth’s hotel leases were fixed for three
to five years and significant inflation in the early
1950s adversely affected Tooth’s internal profit.38
Nonetheless, internal profit remained roughly dou-
ble the reported profit. Tooth chose to report a
small decrease in profit in 1951 and a trivial in-
crease in 1952.
Period 5: 1956–1958 
The major event of this period was an excise in-
crease affecting the 1957 financial year. Missing
data for 1955–1956 limits our analysis of this pe-
riod but the limited evidence available is consis-
tent with the observed behaviour in other periods
following an excise increase. Reported profit
growth was near zero.
Period 6: 1961–1965 
The Companies Act (New South Wales) 1961
was based on the provisions of the UK Companies
Act 1948 and required companies to disclose pro-
visions for taxation, the gross and net amounts of
fixed assets and receivables and various other in-
creases in the detail of the income statement. From
Tooth’s perspective, the Act caused a significant
reduction of scope for understating reported prof-
it. The requirement that ‘provisions’ against assets
had to be disclosed meant that they must be credi-
ble. Furthermore, the requirement to disclose the
provision for taxation allowed the market, for the
first time, to estimate the company’s taxable in-
come as a check on the published profit. 
The first of Tooth’s published statements to reflect
the new disclosure requirements were for the year
ending 31 March 1963. In preparing the financial
statements for that year, the previously undisclosed
reserve accounts were written down by approxi-
mately £13m. Approximately £11m of this was
matched by a reduction in the value of the ‘cost’ ac-
counts for fixed assets (thus leaving net asset values
unchanged).39 The ‘Provision for Doubtful Debts’
was reduced by £2m and approximately £400,000
of excessive depreciation allowances were reversed.
Published net profit rose from £1.5m to £1.9m (by
far the greatest recorded single-period increase in
the firm’s profitability). Similarly, the understate-
ment of published income relative to the level of in-
ternal income reached its lowest point since 1916. 
In 1962 the company issued shares via a rights
issue (at a significant discount) for £1.5m. From an
agency theory perspective, the timing and terms of
this issue may have a managerial self-interest mo-
tive. Returns on Tooth’s equity in subsequent years
were 21% and 30% respectively (double the mar-
ket yield) and any shareholder who participated in
the rights issue enjoyed considerable gains. The
low earnings growth in the years prior to this issue
appear consistent with management discouraging
external shareholders from exercising their rights
to buy shares, leaving more for internal sharehold-
ers. Similarly, at the time of the issue Tooth’s were
well aware of the inflationary effect that the 1961
Companies Act would have on their reported prof-
its for years 1963 onwards, suggesting that the ab-
normal subsequent stock returns were to some
extent predictable by management. However, we
have no evidence regarding the allocation of
shares under the rights issue. Furthermore, be-
cause the rights price represented such a discount
on the diluted market value, it seems unlikely that
the profit-reducing behaviour would have signifi-
cantly impacted on the external shareholders’ up-
take of the rights issue. It is entirely plausible that
the rights issue simply corrected a working capital
shortage which had developed since the late
1950s. Massive investment in outer suburban ho-
tels, inspired by the end of 6 p.m. closing in 1955,
reduced cash balances from £2.6m in 1955, to
–£0.3m in 1957. Negative overall cash balances
persisted until the rights issue in 1962.
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38 Retail Price Index inflation for 1950, 1951 and 1952 was
9.22%, 10.97% and 22.81% respectively. 
39 The likelihood that net asset values remained significant-
ly negatively biased is evidenced by the fact that within eight
years asset revaluations effectively doubled the disclosed
1963 value of fixed assets.
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5.2. A statistical test of the impact of particular
events on earnings understatements
Our discussion of events and examination of the
graphical evidence exposes discernible differences
in particular years, and also emphasises the com-
plexity of events in some periods. Without a basis
for weighting the possible multivariate effects, our
interpretive analysis is not singularly persuasive.
Using a simple regression, we attempt to relate dif-
ferences in understated profits to particular recur-
ring events. We consider three types of events from
Table 3 that we can attribute to particular years: 
1. Expected lobbying by Tooth in relation to
prospective regulatory changes, for which we
expect to observe a larger profit understatement
in the year in which lobbying was known to be
high (e.g. when trading hours and prohibition
were on the agenda) or prior to any actual regu-
latory change (e.g. 6 p.m. closing).
2. Increases in excise duties, for which we expect
a larger understatement of profit in the reporting
period following the announced increase.
3. Competition-reducing actions by Tooth (such 
as price agreements, takeovers and substantial
public house acquisitions). We expect larger
profit understatement in the reporting period
following the acquisition.40
The above events are measured using dummy
variables, which assume a value of one if the par-
ticular event occurred in a given year and zero oth-
erwise. 
We measure earnings understatements in ratio
form (internal profit/published profit) to avoid
scale issues, such as inflation. Because of the per-
sistence of earnings understatements, we use the
change in the earnings understatement ratio as the
dependent variable and control for changes in the
growth in internal profit. Because of the strong ev-
idence of smoothing in our graphical analysis, we
also include the square of the change in growth in
internal profit. More complex exponential forms
may provide better control for smoothing but, be-
cause the change in growth variable is less than
one in all cases except 1918, we opt for the simpler
form but subsequently test the adequacy of the
model specification using Ramsey’s RESET.
By controlling for growth and smoothing in this
manner, the estimated regression coefficients for
Excise, Lobby and Competition in Model 1 test for
effects on changes in earnings understatements be-
yond the level which can be explained purely by
changes in the rate of growth in internal income.
∆Understatementt = a + b1∆Growtht + (1)
b2∆Growth2 +
b3Lobbyt + b4Exciset-1 +
b5Competitiont-1
Where 
∆Understatementt = Changes in the earnings un-
derstatement ration, calculated
thus: (It/Pt–It-1/Pt-1)/(It-1/Pt-1)
∆Growtht = Changes in the growth in inter-
nal earnings, calculated thus:
((It–It-1)–(It-1–It-2))/(It-1–It-2)
∆Growtht2 = the square of ∆Growtht
It = internal profit for year t
Pt = published profit for year t
Lobbyt = 1 in years where lobbying be-
haviour is likely to be abnor-
mally high and 0 otherwise.
Exciset-1 = 1 if an excise rate increase
occurred in the previous year
and 0 otherwise.
Competitiont-1 = 1 in periods where Tooth
made acquisitions of other
breweries or significant num-
bers of public houses and 0
otherwise. 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix
for the dependent, control and test variables are
presented in Table 4. The correlation matrix sug-
gests possible multicollinearity amongst regression
variables; however variance inflation factors and
condition indices indicate no significant multi-
collinearity problems in the regression model.41
Potential for non-normality in the dependent vari-
able is tested using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,
which rejects the null hypothesis of normality at
p=0.001. However, this result is attributable to the
abnormally high growth measure observed in 1918.
Deletion of this outlier results in a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic that fails to reject the null of nor-
mality (p=0.200). Subsequent regression analysis
was conducted both with and without the outlying
observation. With missing profit data for 1955 and
1956, and the requirement for lagged profits, the
number of sample years is 51.
We predict positive coefficients for all the vari-
ables, indicating that the variable is associated
with an increased level of understatement, relative
to the previous financial period. The results for the
regression are reported in Table 5.
The test variables Excise, Lobbying and
Compensation are significantly associated with
changes in proportionate earnings understatement
in the predicted direction. Thus, we confirm the
apparent associations observed in Table 3.
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40 Other events canvassed earlier do not occur in sufficient
numbers to test their impact in this manner.
41 The largest variance inflation factor was 2.58 and the
largest condition index was 3.18.
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Because of the potential leverage exerted on the
regression by the abnormally large growth meas-
ure observed in 1918, the regression model was
also estimated without this observation (not re-
ported). The only difference in the sign or signifi-
cance of the explanatory variables is a reduction in
the significance of ∆Growtht2 to p=0.484.
The Breusch-Pagan statistic reported in Table 5
does not indicate any heteroskedasticity problems.
Although the Durbin-Watson H statistics and
Breusch-Godfrey statistics reported in Table 5 in-
dicate that there is no induced serial correlation in
the residuals, we also estimate the regression with-
out ∆Growth and ∆Growtht2. If we include
∆Growth but omit ∆Growtht2, then Competition,
Excise and Lobby remain significant and positive,
264 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Table 4
Descriptive statistics
Dummy variables
Variable N Minimum Maximum Frequency
Exciset-1 51 0 1 6
Lobbyt-1 51 0 1 6
Competitiont-1 51 0 1 9
Continuous variables
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
∆It/Pt 51 –0.196 0.884 0.012 0.157
∆Growtht 51 –0.505 1.430 0.019 0.261
∆Growtht2 51 0.000 2.050 0.0674 0.287
Correlation matrix
Variable ∆It/Pt ∆Growtht ∆Growtht2 Lobbyt Exciset-1 Competitiont-1
∆It/Pt 1.000
∆Growth 0.762 1.000
∆Growtht2 0.790 0.752 1.000
Lobbyt 0.413 0.269 0.366 1.000
Exciset-1 0.103 –0.036 –0.061 –0.133 1.000
Competitiont–1 0.025 –0.154 –0.006 –0.169 –0.169 1.000
Table 5
Results of regression of change in profit understatement (∆It/Pt)
Adjusted SE of the F test 
Regression results R Square R Square estimate significance Durbin-Watson
N = 51 0.759 0.732 0.082 0.000 1.752*
Explanatory variables B SE t Significance
Constant –0.043 0.015 –2.86 0.012 (2-tail)
∆Growtht 0.266 0.068 3.87 0.000 (2-tail)
∆Growtht2 0.218 0.065 3.37 0.002 (2-tail)
Exciset-1 0.096 0.037 2.62 0.006 (1-tail)
Lobbyt 0.098 0.039 2.51 0.008 (1-tail)
Competitiont-1 0.067 0.032 2.09 0.021 (1-tail)
*The serial correlation of residuals lies in the inconclusive range of the Durbin-Watson critical values (95%
confidence level). The Durbin-Watson H statistic of 0.120 and Breusch-Godfrey statistic of 0.139 (for lag = 1),
which allow for endogeneity within the model, fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation
between residuals. The critical value for these chi-square statistics is 3.84 (95% confidence level). Breusch-
Godfrey statistics were also computed for lags of one to four years and again failed to reject the null. The
Breusch-Pagan statistic (0.05), which tests for possible heteroskedasticity is not significant (p=0.821).D
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but the regression diagnostics (Ramsey’s RESET)
indicate that non-linear combinations of the ex-
planatory variable would improve the model.
When both ∆Growth and ∆Growtht2 are omitted,
the R2 is substantially lower and Competition is no
longer significant in the under-specified model.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, using lags of one
to four years, indicate that the change in the earn-
ings understatement ratio and the control variables
(∆Growth and ∆Growth2) are stationary (at 95%
confidence level).
6. Concluding comments
The use of secret reserves for manipulating earn-
ings is broached in the contemporaneous profes-
sional literature and noted in the accounting and
business research literature. However, there has
been little previous evidence indicating the magni-
tude of such practices. Further, while incentives
were usually phrased in the context of investors’
dividends expectations, this case demonstrates that
political costs, in the sense of positive accounting
theory, also explain much of the periodic earnings
management. 
There is clear evidence that Tooth smoothed re-
ported profits but we also identify persistent un-
derstatements in reported profits, with the relative
reliability of reported profit varying considerably
over time. In particular, periods of high political
costs or incentives to influence regulatory actions
(particularly in the case of excise changes) are as-
sociated with greater understatements, even in cir-
cumstances where the company’s internal profit
was increasing. Our investigation also reveals that
Tooth’s management of the balance sheet was a
strategic response to political costs associated with
competition (market share) concerns. There is, of
course, a necessary relationship between income
and balance sheet management.
Given the limitations associated with the rela-
tively small number of observations in our dataset
and the coarseness of our binary proxies for earn-
ings management incentives, caution should be ap-
plied in evaluating our statistical results. However,
the results obtained complement the descriptive
historical evidence presented in the paper. This
complementarity between our quantitative and
qualitative analyses provides a stronger basis for
our conclusions than either analysis considered
singularly.
While caution must be exercised in generalising
from an analysis of the behaviour of a single firm
in a single market, there are undoubted similarities
between the reporting incentives facing Tooth and
those affecting other large firms operating in mar-
kets with weak competition and subject to similar-
ly ineffective disclosure regimes. While the Tooth
case is complicated by the politically sensitive na-
ture of the firm’s product, most of the issues raised
apply more generally.
The importance of these results for contempo-
rary accounting practices pertains to the impact of
disclosure regulation, as exemplified by the role of
the Companies Act 1961 in forcing Tooth’s aban-
donment of persistent large scale earnings under-
statement. Without such regulation, it seems
unlikely that the improved transparency and accu-
racy would have occurred.
These results indicate that considerable caution
should be exercised in analyses that rely on histor-
ical time series of reported accounting numbers –
notably profits, equity and assets. This is especial-
ly so for periods predating regulatory disclosure
requirements of the kind that curtailed much of
Tooth’s mis-reporting practices, such as the 1961
Companies Act in NSW and the 1948 Act in the
UK. For the business historian, this builds upon
the work of Marriner (1980) and Arnold (1996,
1998), who note the importance of secret reserves
for the reliability of historical published earnings,
by indicating the magnitude of such problems and
by relating earnings management activity to both
political costs and regulatory changes.
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